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School Tracking and Development of Cognitive Skills 
 
The Finnish comprehensive school reform replaced the old two-track school system with a 
uniform nine-year comprehensive school and significantly reduced the degree of 
heterogeneity in the Finnish primary and secondary education. We estimate the effect of this 
reform on the test scores in the Finnish Army Basic Skills test. The identification strategy 
relies on a differences-in-differences strategy and exploits the fact that the reform was 
implemented gradually across the country during a six-year period between 1972 and 1977. 
We find that the reform had a small positive effect on the verbal test scores but no effect on 
the mean performance in the arithmetic or logical reasoning tests. Still in all tests the reform 
improved the scores of students from families where parents had only basic education. 
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Publication of international comparisons of student achievement, such as the OECD’s 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), has generated growing interest in 
the effect of the schooling systems on student outcomes. For reasons not yet fully understood, 
students in some countries seem to perform substantially better than students in other 
countries with roughly equal school resources. In addition, there seems to be no clear 
efficiency-equity trade-off. For example, the Finnish students have consistently been top 
performers in the recent PISA studies. Still, also the variance in test scores is among the 
smallest in Finland. 
One potential explanation for cross-country differences has to do with the timing and the 
extent of tracking or ability grouping of students. Comprehensive and selective school 
systems differ importantly in this respect. In the selective system, tracking into different types 
of schools occurs early and choices made as early as around age ten largely determine later 
schooling options. In the comprehensive system, on the other hand, students often stay in the 
same schools until the end of secondary school. 
In this paper, we study the effect of the comprehensive school system on cognitive test scores. 
Our strategy is to exploit the Finnish comprehensive school reform that gradually transformed 
the Finnish school system from a selective two-track system to a comprehensive school 
system that is similar to most European comprehensive school systems. We estimate the 
effect of this reform on mathematical, verbal, and logical reasoning tests that the Finnish army 
recruits take during the first weeks of the compulsory military service. 
Economic theory suggests that ability grouping may be beneficial for learning since it allows 
schools to target teaching to more homogeneous groups (Lazear, 2001). This helps both the 
best and the weakest students. However, if the peer groups have a large effect on student 
achievement, the students that are placed to lower-ability tracks may also suffer from ability 
grouping. Since reallocation of students across schools necessarily implies that some students 
experience an increase in the average peer quality while other students experience an equal 
decrease, the overall benefits of tracking also depend on whether the peer-effects are linear or 
not, i.e. whether bad students hamper learning more than good students improve it. A less 
controversial conclusion is that if the average peer group quality affects learning, the variance 
in student performance should be higher with ability grouping. 3 
 
Empirical literature has made a lot of progress on understanding the effects of tracking within 
schools. Most recent evidence comes from a randomized experiment in Kenya where 
randomly selected schools implemented tracking and non-tracking policies. Duflo, Dupas, 
and Kremer (2008) show that tracking within schools seems to benefit all students and they 
attribute this effect to better targeting of teaching that is made possible by more homogeneous 
groups. As noted by the authors it is not clear whether the results would be similar in 
developed countries where student population is less heterogeneous and where additional 
resources such as remedial education and special education programs may already help 
teachers to deal with different types of students. In addition, ability grouping is not the only 
difference between selective and comprehensive school systems. In a selective system, also 
teacher quality is likely to differ between schools and the curriculum is typically quite 
different in high ability and low ability tracks. Hence, even a well designed randomized 
experiment of tracking within schools is unlikely to settle the policy question whether the 
school system should be selective or comprehensive. 
In the developed countries, most existing evidence on the potential benefits of selective vs 
comprehensive system originates from cross-country comparisons. For example, Hanushek 
and Wößmann (2006) use data from international student assessments and find that the 
variance in the test scores is higher in the countries where tracking takes place at an early age. 
At the same time, early tracking seems to have generally negative effects on mean 
performance, though the evidence on these mean effects is less consistent. A similar cross-
country approach is used by Brunello and Checchi (2007) and Waldinger (2006). Neither of 
these studies confirms the Hanushek -Wößmann results according to which early tracking 
increases inequality in achievement 
Conflicting results from previous studies reflect the difficulties in analysing the effect of 
school system based on cross-country data. While these studies try to control for variation due 
to other factors by including early test scores (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2006; and 
Waldinger, 2006) or by using time variation in the tracking age (Brunello and Checchi, 2007) 
it is far from clear that all relevant cross-country differences would be accounted for. 
We claim that analysing the changes in test scores when a country switches from a tracked to 
a comprehensive system is a more promising approach to identify the effects of the school 
system. Previous attempts to do this include Kerckhoff et al (1996) as well as Galindo-Rueda 
and Vignoles (2005) who both study the effect of gradual movement from selective school 4 
 
system into a comprehensive system in England and examine the effects on cognitive ability 
measured in the National Child Development Survey (NCDS). However, as noted by 
Manning and Pischke (2006) the areas that first switched to a comprehensive system in 
England were on average poorer than the areas which retained the tracked system. It is 
therefore difficult to distinguish the effect of school systems from these regional differences 
using a single cohort data such as the NCDS. Manning and Pischke also demonstrate that 
controlling for pre-tracking test scores or using arguably exogenous variation in the timing of 
the reform as an instrument do not solve the problem due to endogenous timing of the reform.  
Compared to these studies the distinct advantage of the Finnish reform is the availability of 
comparable data from several cohorts, which avoids the need to rely on the cross-sectional 
variation only. The Finnish comprehensive school reform was implemented gradually region 
by region between 1972 and 1977. This gradual implementation and the availability of data 
on several cohorts allow controlling for regional variation and any time trends in the student 
achievement using a difference-in-differences approach. Furthermore, our data also include 
information on families, which makes it possible to estimate the effect of the reform based on 
data on brothers who were placed into different school systems. We estimate the effect of this 
reform on the cognitive test scores that the Finnish army recruits take when they first enter the 
mandatory military service of which very few young men are exempted. We find that the 
reform had a small positive effect on the verbal test scores but no effect on the mean 
performance in the arithmetic or logical reasoning tests. Still, the reform had a positive effect 
on test scores in all tests in a group of students from families where parents had only basic 
education. The reform did not significantly reduce the overall variance of the test scores. 
We are not the first to study the effects of comprehensive school reforms. However, none of 
the earlier papers addresses the effects of the school system on the skill distribution. For 
example, Meghir and Palme (2005) examine the effects of a Swedish comprehensive school 
reform on educational attainment and earnings. They find that the Swedish reform increased 
the earnings and completed schooling of the children of working-class families. In our 
previous research (Pekkarinen, Uusitalo and Pekkala, 2006) we examine the effects of the 
Finnish comprehensive school reform on intergenerational income elasticity and find that 
income mobility increased after the reform. Holmlund (2008) reports similar results based on 
the Swedish comprehensive school reform. Black, Deveraux, and Salvanes (2005) report that 
the Norwegian comprehensive school reform increased educational attainment. While all 5 
 
these papers report important effects on various labor market outcomes, they are silent about 
the mechanisms behind the results. By measuring the effects on productive skills we may get 
a step closer to understanding how differences in school systems affect learning. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we describe the 
comprehensive school reform in detail. The third section presents the data. Particular 
emphasis is put on the description of the cognitive tests of the army. In section four, we 
describe our empirical approach and in section five present the results. The sixth section 
concludes with some final comments. 
 
2. Comprehensive school reform
2  
2.1 Background 
Finland introduced a wide-ranging comprehensive school reform in the 1970’s. Similar 
reforms had already taken place in Sweden in 1950s and in Norway in 1960s (Meghir and 
Palme, 2005; Aalvik, Salvanes and Vaage, 2003). The Finnish comprehensive school reform 
abolished the old two-track school system and created a uniform 9-year comprehensive 
school. The main motivation of the reform was to provide equal educational opportunities to 
all students, irrespective of place of residence or social background.  
 
In the pre-reform system all students entered primary school (“kansakoulu”) at the age of 
seven. After four years in the primary school, at age 11, the students were faced with the 
choice of applying to general secondary school (“oppikoulu”) or continuing in the primary 
school. Admissions to the general secondary school were based on an entrance examination, a 
teacher assessment and primary school grades. Those who were admitted continued their 
schooling in the junior secondary schools for five years and often went on to the upper 
secondary school for three additional years. At the end of the upper secondary school the 
students took the matriculation examination that provided eligibility to university-level 
studies. Those who were not admitted or who did not apply to the general secondary school 
continued in primary school for two more years, and spent in total six years in the primary 
school. By the beginning of 1970s most primary schools had continuation classes or civic 
                                                 
2 This section draws on our previous paper (Pekkarinen et al 2006) 6 
 
schools that kept almost the entire age cohort at school up to the 8th (and in many 
municipalities 9th) grade. This education did not provide eligibility for senior secondary 
school or for university studies. After civic school most students continued into vocational 
education or discontinued their schooling. The pre-reform system is described schematically 
in the left-hand panel of Figure 1. 
 
 
[FIGURE 1: SCHOOL SYSTEMS] 
 
 
2.2 Content of the comprehensive school reform 
 
The reform introduced a new curriculum and changed the structure of primary and secondary 
education. The new curriculum increased the academic content of education compared to the 
old primary school curriculum by increasing the share of mathematics and sciences. In 
addition, one foreign language became compulsory for all students. Thus, the new 
comprehensive school curriculum resembled the old general secondary school curriculum and 
exposed the pupils who, in the absence of the reform would have stayed in the primary 
school, to a significantly more academic education.  
 
The structure of the post-reform school system is described in the right-hand panel of Figure 
1. Previous primary school, civic school and junior secondary school were replaced by a nine-
year comprehensive school. At the same time the upper secondary school was separated from 
the junior secondary school to form a distinct form of institution. Thus, after the reform, all 
the pupils followed the same curriculum in the same establishments (comprehensive schools) 
up to age 16. After this, the students chose between applying to upper secondary school or to 




2.3 The implementation of the comprehensive school reform 
 
The implementation of the reform was preceded by a process of planning that lasted for two 
decades. Government working groups had proposed creating a comprehensive school already 7 
 
in 1948, 1957, 1959, and 1965. The first experimental comprehensive schools started their 
operation in 1967. Finally, in 1968 the Parliament approved the School Systems Act 
(467/1968) according to which the two track school system would be gradually replaced with 
a nine-year comprehensive school. The adoption of the new school system was to take place 
between 1972 and 1977, and the order in which the municipalities adopted the reform was to 
be determined by geography starting from the Northern Finland where access to education 
was most limited. A regional implementation plan divided the country into implementation 
regions and dictated when each region would adopt the comprehensive school system.  
 
In each region, the five lowest primary school grades were to start in the comprehensive 
school immediately during the fall term of the year stated in the implementation plan. After 
this, each incoming cohort of first graders would start their schooling in the comprehensive 
school. The pupils that were already above the fifth grade in the year that the region entered 
the reform would complete their schooling according to the pre-reform system. Thus, in each 
region it took approximately four years to complete the reform. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates how the reform spread through the Finnish municipalities during 1972-
1977. The first municipalities that adopted the reform in 1972 were predominantly situated in 
the northernmost province of Lapland. In 1973 the reform was mostly adopted in the north-
eastern regions. From thereon, the reform spread so that it was adopted in 1974 in the 
northwest, in 1975 in south-east, in 1976 in the south-west, and finally, in 1977 in the capital 
region of Helsinki. 
 
[FIGURE 2: COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL REFORM MAP]  
 
2.4 The comprehensive school reform as a quasi-experiment 
 
The Finnish comprehensive school reform is in many ways a promising natural experiment 
for evaluating the effects of early versus late tracking on student outcomes. A particularly 
useful setup was created by the regional implementation plan that dictated when each 
municipality moved into comprehensive school system. Using a fixed-effects approach we 
can control for other simultaneous time trends and regional differences and purge the estimate 
of school system from these confounding factors.  
 8 
 
However, there are some caveats to the approach. First of all, as is clear from Figure 2, some 
municipalities implemented the reform earlier that the rest of the municipalities in the region. 
Although the timing of the reform followed the national implementation plan, the choice of 
first municipalities to implement the reform was probably not entirely random. The 
comprehensive school reform also faced intensive resistance. Most common arguments 
against the reform were that abolishing tracking would reduce the quality of education. As a 
compromise, ability tracking was partially retained within the comprehensive school. Even 
after the reform the students were divided into ability groups in foreign language and math 
classes, but studied all other subjects in their regular (not tracked) classes. This ability 
grouping was eventually abolished in 1985. The socialization of private general secondary 
schools under municipal ownership was also opposed especially in Helsinki where some of 
these schools had a distinguished reputation. After an intensive debate, it was agreed that 
several private schools would be allowed to survive as private alternatives to the 
comprehensive schools in the Helsinki region even after the reform. Many of these still exist 
as private senior secondary schools. However, also these private schools had to follow the 
national curriculum, were funded by the municipalities and could not charge student fees. 




A fundamental problem in assessing the effects of a school reforms on student performance is 
that students in separate school systems rarely participate in comparable tests. Sometimes it is 
possible to use nation-wide or international comparisons of student achievement. However, 
since most large-scale school reforms took place in 1960s and 1970s when testing was not as 
widespread as today, it is difficult to find tests implemented to representative and reasonably 
large samples of students from both pre- and post reform school systems.  
In this paper we use the basic skills test results from the Finnish Army. Since military service 
is mandatory in Finland almost the entire male cohort takes the test. The Army test is given to 
all new conscripts between the third and the sixth week of their service. The average age at 
the time when these men are tested is 20, so obviously also other factors than school system 
may have had an effect on the results. On the other hand, we are probably more interested in 
long-lasting outcomes of school systems than the immediate effects on test results. The 9 
 
Finnish Army test is also a strong predictor of earnings and occupation later in life, so any 
effect of school system on the test scores will have important consequences for lifetime 
earnings.  
The Finnish Army Basic Skills test is designed to measure general abilities. The Army uses 
the test results in selecting conscripts to officer training. The test consists of three subtests: 
verbal, arithmetic, and logical reasoning. Each subtest includes forty multiple choice 
questions sorted in increasing order of difficulty. In the verbal reasoning subtest, the subject 
has to choose synonyms or antonyms of given words, select words that belong to the same 
category as a given word, exclude words from a group of words, and to identify similar 
relationships between word pairs. The arithmetic reasoning test asks the subject to complete 
number series, solve verbally expressed mathematical problems, compute simple arithmetic 
operations, and to choose similar relationships between pairs of numbers. The logical 
reasoning test is a standard “culture free” intelligence test based on Raven’s progressive 
matrices and its results should therefore be less affected by pre-test schooling.
3 On the other 
hand, both the verbal and arithmetic reasoning parts test skills that are primarily taught in 
school. 
The test was originally created in 1955 and re-designed in 1981. Exactly the same test was 
used over the span of years that we analyze. From 1982 the test results are stored in the Army 
database that also includes personal identification numbers, making it possible to link the test 
results to information on test takers from other registers. Our data include all conscripts born 
between 1962 and 1966 who were found from the Army database, i.e. those who started their 
military service after January 1982. There is some selectivity in the data due to the fact that it 
is possible to enter to military service as a volunteer at age 17 and thus some men in the oldest 
cohorts served before the Army register was created. It is also possible to be exempted from 
the military service due to religious or ethical conviction, though in 1980s this was rare. The 
more common reasons for being exempt from military service are severe health conditions, 
most often related to mental health problems. However, even these criteria were substantially 
stricter in 1980s than what they are today. A comparison of the number of observations by 
birth cohort in our data and the corresponding cohort size in the 1984 population census 
reveals that our test score data contain information on 85.3 percent of the relevant male 
cohorts.  
                                                 
3 The contents of the tests are described in detail in Tiihonen et al (2005). 10 
 
In Figure 3 we plot the distribution of the raw scores, i.e. the number of correct answers in 
each subtest. In the bottom right corner we plot the distribution of the average score. Two 
things might be noted from the Figure. First, there is plenty of variation in the test scores; the 
raw scores are distributed over the whole range from zero to forty. Second, the distribution of 
the test scores, particularly the distribution of the average score seems to be close to the 
normal distribution, a feature that we will exploit later.  
FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF THE TEST SCORES] 
Statistics Finland linked the test scores from the Army data to Census data on Finnish 
population. The Statistics Finland longitudinal census file contains data on the entire 
population living in Finland in 1970, -75, -80, -85 and -90. From 1990 onwards information is 
available for all years. Census data is mainly based on administrative registers. For example, 
information on education is based on the Register of Degrees and Examinations that collects 
data on all degrees granted directly from educational institutions. Data on place of residence 
in each census year is based on the Population Register. In general these register data are of 
very high quality. Only a few persons have any missing data, and the main reasons for not 
being included in the census data are residing abroad and death. In other words, our data does 
not suffer from attrition problems that often plague similar studies. 
From the census data we gathered information on the date of birth and the place of residence 
in 1970, -75 and -80, which jointly determine whether the individual attended a tracked or a 
comprehensive school system. Statistics Finland does not release these data at a municipality-
level, but per our request created an indicator classifying municipalities into six categories 
according to the year in which the comprehensive school reform was implemented in each 
municipality. Except for those who moved between census years between municipalities that 
implemented the reform at different years, we can accurately determine which school system 
was in place when the students were in the relevant age. The movers were dropped from the 
data used below.  
The census data also include family codes that can used to identify brother pairs and to gather 
information on parents’ education and earnings. To be more exact, these family codes are 
based on persons living in the same household, not necessarily biological family members. 
We use family codes from the 1975 census when the oldest men in the sample were 13 years 
old and most likely still living at home.  11 
 
Table 1 reports the mean test scores by cohort and reform region. It shows that there are large 
differences across regions and a general increase in the test scores over time. These regional 
differences are correlated with the average education level and the average income in the 
region. An increase in the test scores over time, generally known as the Flynn-effect, has also 
been documented by Koivunen (2007) for a longer time period but naturally reflects also 
other differences between cohorts than those due to the school system.  
The shaded area of the table indicates the students that went to the comprehensive school. 
Since these students are younger and concentrated in the regions with below average test 
scores, it is obvious that a cross-section comparison of regions or a time-series comparison of 
subsequent cohorts would not produce reliable estimates for the effect of the comprehensive 
school reform. 
[TABLE 1: MEAN SCORE BY COHORT & REGION] 
 
4. Estimation methods 
Our goal is to estimate the causal effect of the tracking regime on the army test scores. That 
is, we want to determine how an average student, or a student with certain characteristics, 
would have fared, had she or he been assigned to the reformed comprehensive system instead 
of the previous selective early tracking system. We use a fixed effects approach that controls 
for regional differences as well as general trends over time. The effect of the comprehensive 
school reform is identified because the timing of the reform differs across regions. 
Most of our estimates are based on a following regression model: 
ijt ijt it ij ijt C D D y ε β α + + Ψ′ + Ω′ + =      (1) 
where yijt is the army test score of individual i who went to school in region j and belongs to 
cohort t. Dij and Dit are region and cohort specific dummies, and Cijt  is an indicator for a pupil 
attending comprehensive school. 
The parameter of interest in (1) is β. The identifying assumption is that the comprehensive 
school indicator, Cijt, is uncorrelated with the error term conditional on the other regressors. 
This assumption, and the fact that Di and Dit enter (1) additively, reflect the basic differences-12 
 
in-differences assumptions. The parameter β is an unbiased estimate of the average causal 
effect of comprehensive schooling if the timing of the reform is uncorrelated with other 
region-specific changes in student outcomes. 
In addition to the mean effects of the reform, we are also interested in the effect of the reform 
on the variance of the test scores. A natural way of examining this is the explicit modelling of 
the error variance of Equation (1). We could do this in two steps by taking the residuals from 
the Equation (1) and then explaining the squared residuals with the cohort and region 
dummies and the comprehensive school reform indicator. This procedure would be similar to 
standard heteroskedasticity tests. Since the OLS-residuals are unbiased estimates of the error 
terms, the two-step estimates are consistent.  
 
A more straightforward way is to model simultaneously the effect of the reform on both the 
mean and the variance of the test scores. Assuming that the error term follows a normal 
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jt σ  indicate that the variance in the test scores may vary across regions and 
cohorts and may be affected by the reform. We parameterize the model assuming that log-
variance is an additive function of the region, cohort and reform dummies. This also ensures 
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where β measures the effect of the reform on the mean score and γ its effect on the variance. 13 
 
5. Results 
The baseline results are reported in Table 2. In Column (1) we simply regress the average test 
score on the comprehensive school dummy, and find that those who attended the 
comprehensive school scored on average 0.5 points less in the army test. However, the results 
in Column (2) reveal that this negative correlation reflects the fact that regions with lower test 
scores adopted the reform first. When full sets of birth cohort and region dummies are 
included in the regression, the effect of comprehensive school is close to zero. The effect 
becomes slightly larger but remains insignificant in Column (3) where we control for the age 
at the time of the test, and in Column (4) where we restrict the data to those who took the test 
at age 20.  
It is not entirely clear whether controlling for the age at the test date is an appropriate 
approach. A fairly common reason for postponing military service is studying at a university. 
Also many high school graduates prefer serving in the military at age 19, before pursuing 
further studies at universities. This selectivity is reflected in our data. Those who take the test 
at age 20 tend to perform worse than those taking the test at age 19 or at age 21. On the other 
hand, limiting the analysis to the twenty-year-olds does correct for potential selectivity due to 
the fact that the test scores are available only from year 1982 onwards. In Column (5), we add 
family fixed effects to the equation, thus identifying the effect of the reform from the 
differences between brothers that attended different school systems. The effect remains small 
and insignificant. Interestingly, adding family fixed effects also reverses the positive trend in 
the test scores, indicating that the birth order effect on the test scores is larger than the 
difference across the birth cohorts.
4  
[TABLE 2: BASIC RESULTS]  
In Table 3 we examine separately the effect of the school reform on different tests. In Column 
(1) we regress each test score separately on the region and cohort dummies and a dummy 
variable indicating whether a person had attended a comprehensive school. In Column (2) we 
again add controls for age at the test date, in Column (3) limit the data to twenty-year-olds, 
and, in Column (4), add family fixed effects. For brevity we only report the coefficients of the 
comprehensive school dummy in each case. According to the results reported in Table 3, the 
                                                 
4 The birth order effect was also found in a Norwegian study of the Army test scores (Kristenssen and Bjerkdal, 
2007). 14 
 
comprehensive school reform had no significant effects on either math or logical reasoning 
tests. The effect on the verbal ability test is positive, but statistically significant only if we 
control for the age at the test date or limit the data to those who are 20 years old when taking 
the test. Even then the effect is small. The largest estimate, 0.172 points in the test, is only 
0.02 standard deviations. The estimates that control for family fixed effects range from 0.05 
in the verbal test to 0.16 in the logical reasoning test. However, family fixed effects estimates 
tend to be much less precise than the estimates that exploit also between-family variation, and 
are therefore never significantly different from zero or significantly different from the point 
estimates reported in Columns (1)-(3). 
The finding that the comprehensive school reform has its largest effects on the verbal test was 
perhaps to be expected. After all, verbal skills are something that are learned in schools, and 
so the changes in school system may well have effects on these verbal skills. If indeed the 
logical reasoning test truly measures innate reasoning abilities, pre-test schooling should have 
little or no effect on the test. Finally, the changes in the mathematics teaching resulting from 
the reform were perhaps not as significant. As noted above, the ability grouping was retained 
in mathematics and, as a result, math classes continued to be taught at three different ability 
levels after the reform.
5  
[Table 3: EFFECTS ON DIFFERENT TEST ITEMS] 
In Table 4 we report the maximum-likelihood estimates measuring the effects of the reform 
on both the mean and on the (log)variance of the test scores. We estimate these equations 
separately for each test. All equations include cohort and region effects on both the mean and 
the variance, but we report only the effects of the comprehensive school. According to Table 
4 the maximum-likelihood method produces very similar estimates for the effect of the reform 
on the mean scores as the linear regression model used in Tables 2 and 3. The effects are 
significant only for the verbal test. The effects on the variance of the test scores are small. In 
                                                 
5 As a robustness check we experimented by adding region-specific linear trends to the equations reported in 
Table 3. In these specifications the effect of the reform on the verbal test score gets somewhat larger; point 
estimate is 0.32. The effects on other two tests also grow slightly but remain statistically insignificant. We take 
these results as an indication that at least the qualitative results cannot be explained by pre-existing differences in 
trends in the test scores. The estimates are reported in the Appendix in the end of the paper. We also specified 
the model so that instead of treating the comprehensive school as a discrete indicator, we replaced it with a 
continuous variable that measures years of exposure to the comprehensive system. This varies between 5 and 9 
years depending on whether the students entered the comprehensive system from the first grade or whether they 
were already in school when the reform was implemented in their area. These estimates do not suggest that the 
length of exposure matters, perhaps indicating that changes in tracking were more important than the changes in 
curriculum during first four years in school. Also these results can be found in the Appendix.         15 
 
the math test the effect is close to zero. In the verbal and logical reasoning test the reform 
reduced the variance between 1.7 and 2.6 percent. Only the effect on the logical reasoning test 
is statistically significant. Since the test score data that we use are the raw scores from an 
identical test implemented for different cohorts, issues such as standardization of the test 
scores or variation in the test across the years cannot explain the results.  
Another natural way of examining the effects of the reform on the distribution of the test 
scores would be to use quantile regression models. However, even though we measure test 
scores with a 40 point scale, we cannot detect effects on quantiles, unless the effect is at least 
one full point. Since even the largest observed effects are below 0.2 points, a quantile 
regression did not produce meaningful results. 
[Table 4: EFFECTS ON MEAN AND VARIANCE] 
In Tables 5A and 5B we examine the effects of the comprehensive school reform by family 
background. In Table 5A we estimate regression models similar to those reported in Column 
(2) of Table 3 but add an indicator of parents’ education and its interaction with the reform 
dummy. We classify parents as having higher education if at least one of the parents has 
completed at least 12 years of education. In the pre-reform schooling system this generally 
refers to a situation where the parent attended the more academic track. The parents’ income 
is measured by summing the annual taxable income of both parents, deflating the income to 
the 1980 price level and taking an average over the census years 1970, -75 and -80. 
According to the results reported in Table 5A, parental schooling has a clear effect on the test 
scores. Men with highly educated parents have 2.0 points higher score in the verbal test, 2.2 
points higher score in the math test, and 1.5 points higher score in the logical reasoning test. 
The effect of the reform – now referring to the effect on those with less educated parents – is 
positive and statistically significant in the verbal test and positive but insignificant in the other 
two tests. More importantly, the interaction between parents’ education and the 
comprehensive schooling is always negative and in all but the logical reasoning test 
statistically significant. A closer look at the average test score reveals that the reform 
increased the score for those with less educated parents by about 0.2, but the interaction 
coefficient is approximately equally large, producing a zero effect for men with highly 
educated parents. 16 
 
Table 5B repeats the analysis using parents’ income. The results are qualitatively similar to 
those with parents’ education. Men with richer parents tend to score better in all tests, and the 
interaction between the parents’ income and the reform dummy is negative for all tests. 
[Tables 5A and 5B: EFFECTS BY FAMILY BACKGROUND] 
 
6. Conclusions 
Persistent differences in average test scores across countries and over time have received 
plenty of attention in recent years. One often suggested explanation for these differences is 
the educational system. In particular, the tracking of pupils into different groups by ability and 
aspirations has been considered a potentially important factor. However, both the economic 
theory and the available empirical evidence remain inconclusive when it comes to the effects 
of tracking regimes on test scores. 
In this paper we have estimated the effect of the comprehensive school reform on the Finnish 
Army Basic Skills Test scores. Unlike previous literature that had to rely on cross-country 
comparisons or comparisons of regions within countries, we can estimate the effect of the 
comprehensive school reform on test scores using a differences-in–differences approach and 
single-country data. As such, our study provides a more serious attempt at identifying the 
causal effect of school systems on test outcomes. 
We find that the reform had a small positive effect on the average verbal test scores and no 
significant positive or negative effect on the average arithmetic or logical reasoning test 
results. The effect on the verbal test scores appears to arise entirely from families where the 
parents had only basic education. In this group the reform had a positive effect also on the test 
scores in the arithmetic or logical reasoning tests. Finally, we find that the effect of the reform 
on the variance of the test scores is very small. 
Overall, our results indicate that the effects of school tracking on cognitive skills tend to be 
small. The important effects of tracking on other later-in-life outcomes such as earnings, 
completed schooling or college enrolment that have been reported in previous research are 
therefore likely to be related to other mechanisms than the direct effects on skill formation.  
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Figure 1 Finnish school systems before and after the comprehensive school reform 
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Figure 2 The implementation of the comprehensive school reform across regions 1972-1977 
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Table 1 Average test score by region and cohort 
 
   Reform  year     
Birth cohort  1972 1973  1974 1975 1976 1977 Total 
1962  19.96 19.87 20.30 20.73 21.26 22.57 20.76 
  [2,471] [3,629] [5,286] [5,095] [5,304] [2,822] [24,607] 
1963  20.82 20.57  20.94 21.35 21.91 22.96 21.42 
  [2,776] [4,126]  [6,037] [6,190] [6,174] [3,516] [28,819] 
1964  20.70 20.4  21.04 21.44 21.85 23.07 21.44 
  [2,663] [3,967]  [5,751] [5,964] [6,188] [3,696] [28,229] 
1965  20.92 20.74  21.09 21.48 22.18 23.02 21.60 
  [2,494] [3,706]  [5,517] [5,846] [5,790] [3,594] [26,947] 
1966  21.42 21.13  21.55 21.74 22.35 23.41 21.96 
  [2,023] [3,037]  [4,732] [5,176] [5,094] [3,344] [23,406] 
Total 20.74 20.52  20.97 21.35 21.91 23.02 21.44 
 [12,427] [18,465]  [27,323] [28,271] [28,550] [16,972] [132,008] 
Note: The shaded areas indicate cohorts that were affected by the post-reform educational system. Number of observations in 




Table 2 Effects on test score average 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
  No controls  Region & 
cohort 




Reform -0.524***  0.0009  0.062  0.056  0.111 
  (0.035) (0.059) (0.057) (0.066)  (0.146) 
Birth year 1963    0.549***  0.170***  0.153***  -0.196 
   (0.054)  (0.053)  (0.059)  (0.133) 
Birth year 1964    0.482***  0.187***  0.212***  -0.329** 
   (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.064)  (0.139) 
Birth year 1965    0.608***  0.386***  0.423***  -0.460*** 
   (0.065)  (0.063)  (0.071)  (0.157) 
Birth year 1966    0.935***  0.495***  0.499***  -0.538*** 
   (0.071)  (0.070)  (0.080)  (0.174) 
Reform region 1973    -0.203***  -0.211***  -0.273***   
   (0.070)  (0.068)  (0.078)   
Reform region 1974    0.222***  0.272***  0.247***   
   (0.066)  (0.064)  (0.074)   
Reform region 1975    0.527***  0.513***  0.561***   
   (0.069)  (0.067)  (0.078)   
Reform region 1976    1.139***  1.211***  1.286***   
   (0.074)  (0.072)  (0.084)   
Reform region 1977    2.111***  2.151***  2.552***   
   (0.086)  (0.084)  (0.098)   
Constant 21.96***  20.47***  19.94***  19.87***  21.11*** 
 (0.028)  (0.073)  (0.0713)  (0.081) (0.0874) 
Obs 142001  142001  142001  107930  107930 
R-squared  0.002 0.015 0.074 0.020  0.002 
Notes: The dependent variable is an unweighted average in three tests. In Column (3) 13 one year age dummies are included 







Table 3 Effects in different tests 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Only  region   
& cohort 




Math test  -0.063 0.014 0.022 0.102 
  (0.074) (0.072) (0.083) (0.191) 
Verbal test  0.107 0.172**  0.143* 0.0658 
  (0.070) (0.068) (0.078) (0.178) 
Logical reasoning  -0.011 0.032 0.035 0.161 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.062) (0.152) 
The entries in the table are coefficients of the dummy variable indicating that the person attended comprehensive school. 
Each regression model is estimated separately and includes cohort and region fixed effects. Only 20 year old test takers are 
used in the family fixed effects regressions 
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Table 4 ML-estimates of the effect of the reform on mean and variance of the test scores 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




Effect  on  mean  0.012 0.168** 0.039  0.062 
 (0.072)  (0.068)  (0.053)  (0.057) 
Effect on log variance  -0.002  -0.016  -0.026**  -0.017 




Table 5A: Effect of the reform by parents’ education 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Math  Verbal  Logical 
Reasoning 
Average score 
High ed. parents  2.013***  1.826***  1.355***  1.733*** 
 (0.0734)  (0.0692)  (0.0545)  (0.058) 
Reform 0.180**  0.306***  0.125*  0.196*** 
 (0.0894)  (0.0843)  (0.0664)  (0.070) 
Reform ×   -0.281***  -0.213**  -0.157**  -0.224*** 
high ed. parents  (0.0905)  (0.0854)  (0.0672)  (0.071) 
Constant 11.84***  16.58***  19.67***  16.11*** 
 (0.563)  (0.531)  (0.417)  (0.443) 
Observations  127 206  127404  127432  127 167 
R-squared 0.043  0.072  0.059  0.092 
 
Table 5B: Effect of the reform by parents’ income 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 




Parents’  income  2.465*** 2.105*** 1.614*** 2.048*** 
  (0.0698) (0.0659) (0.0519)  (0.055) 
Reform 0.0397  0.202***  0.0470  0.085 
  (0.0753) (0.0712) (0.0560)  (0.059) 
Reform  ×    -0.275*** -0.212*** -0.168*** -0.212*** 
parents’  income  (0.0844) (0.0797) (0.0628)  (0.066) 
Constant  13.19*** 17.80*** 20.58*** 17.27*** 
  (0.559) (0.528) (0.415) (0.440) 
Observations  127 120  127 318  127 346  127 081 
R-squared  0.094 0.079 0.066 0.102 
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Appendix: Additional results  
 
Table A1: Effect by years in comprehensive school 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Math  Verbal  Logical 
Reasoning 
Average score 
      
5 years in   0.021  0.205**  0.001  0.063 
comprehensive (0.105) (0.099)  (0.0788)  (0.0831) 
6 years in   -0.048  0.123  0.120  0.057 
comprehensive (0.142) (0.134) (0.107) (0.112) 
7 years in   -0.175  0.153  0.052  -0.001 
comprehensive (0.186) (0.175) (0.139) (0.147) 
8 years in   -0.106  0.186  0.127  0.057 
comprehensive (0.237) (0.223) (0.177) (0.187) 
9 years in   -0.040  0.317  0.001  0.079 
comprehensive (0.307) (0.289) (0.230) (0.242) 
Constant  16.69*** 20.53*** 22.33*** 19.87*** 
  (0.173) (0.163) (0.129) (0.136) 
Observations  107974 108176 108208 107930 
R-squared  0.016 0.014 0.018 0.020 
In all columns the model includes a full set of dummy variables for region and cohort 
 
 
Table A2: Allowing for linear regional trends in test scores 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Math  Verbal  Logical 
Reasoning 
Average score 
      
Reform 0.113  0.317***  0.061  0.153** 
  (0.088) (0.083) (0.065) (0.069) 
Constant  12.65*** 16.98*** 20.17*** 16.66*** 
  (0.522) (0.492) (0.387) (0.411) 
Observations 142051  142286  142322  142001 
R-squared  0.070 0.058 0.047 0.074 
In all columns the model includes a full set of dummy variables for region and their interactions with a linear time trend as 
well as a full set of cohort dummies. 
 
 